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An issue as topical and controversial today as it was as the beginning of the
20th centurv is who does the doctor serve? Does he (or she) practise medicine to
heal his patients, make a livelihood and attain status in society, or does he
have a wider social function involving a duty to society and its restructuring
with an accompanying responsibility for preventive health care? George Bernard
Shaw, social reformer as well as dramatist, tackled this question in 1906 in 'The
Doctors' Dilemma', which he described as a tragedy. In his preface to the play.
written in 1911. he urged that medical services be reformed, because, as he
argued, the object of the profession was 'not the health of the patient and of
the community at large, but the protection of the doctor's livelihood and the
concealment of hi3 errors'.2 South African doctors also faced this dilemma
during the same period.
In the middle of 1901, shortly after the Witwatersrand gold mines had restarted
operations, and while the Anglo-Boer War was still in progress, major health
problems surfaced in the industry. By the time that peace"was declared (in May
1902). the mortality from disease among white miners and African mineworkers had
assumed such serious dimensions that Lord Milner. Governor of the Transvaal and
High Commissioner of South Africa, was forced to intervene. Remedial measures
were essential, the more especially as Milner's financial plans for the
reconstruction of the Transvaal under British rule hinged largely on the
'overspill' from the gold mines.
This paper examines the responses of the Witwatersrand medical profession to the
working and living conditions of white and African mineworkers both of which had
a detrimental effect on their health. It also specifically analyses the reactions
of these doctors to the excessive disease death rate among African mineworkers.
chiefly from pneumonia, and to the hieh mortality from silicosis (miners'
phthisis) which predominated among white miners, especially machine operators. It
argues that the doctors, who were'in a conflictual position, subordinated the
needs of their patients (both black and white) for their own economic gain and to
further the financial priorities of the mineowners, the so-called Randlords.
Health services before the Anglo-Boer War: the social context
The social context for the industry's early-day health services can be quickly
sketched. Bv the early 1890s, less than a decade after the discovery of gold (in
1866), the Witwatersrand could bv no means be described as a medical backwater.
Nor was Johannesburg, the centre of medical practice, a typically crude mining
settlement; as earlv as 1888 it had moved 'from the position of a digger's camp
to that of one of the largest towns in South Africa'.3 In 1898 it haa~a white
population of at least 76,500, and a black population, including Africans,
^coloureds' (persons of 'mixed1 descent) and Indians, of roughly double.4 The
total population was approximately ten times larger than that of Butte (30,000),
then in its hev day. and acknowledged as the economic capital of Montana in the
USA.3 Johannesburg's suburbs were rstatelv" and contained houses which cost from
£1000 to £4000.* Such rapid progress was not merely material. Professional
societies, including the Transvaal Medical Society, proliferated, and cultural
activities, which were strengthened bv the Transvaal s strong ties with Western
Europe, catered for all kinds of tastes.
Despite its elements of sophistication, and although it was not a company town in
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the strict sense of the word. Johannesburg nevertheless retained the ethos of a
mining town. After all. the very reason for its establishment and continued
existence was the gold mining industry. More than this, the industry not onlv
maintained its dominance, but also increased it: most additional enterprises,
industrial or other, were in one wav or another connected to the mines. The
entire community knew that all livelihoods- even those which did not impinge
directly on the gold mines, depended on the success of the industry. What was
good for the industry, the residents logically reasoned, could only be good for
themselves. Consequently most of the Wifwatersrand's inhabitants deferred to the
policies and practices of the mineowners. These were expressed by their
authoritative mouthpiece, the Chamber of Mines, and by the many newspapers thev
controlled or influenced. Nor were doctors immune to the power and propaganda of
the Chamber: they. too. were often keen to further the interests of the industry.
Notwithstanding Dutch republican (Boer) rule, and the cosmopolitan composition of
the town. British precepts infused this urban community thai was largely English-
speaking. 7 Doctors, too. were for the most part British-born and Brifish-
trainedl Through their membership of the British Medical Association and by
subscribing to overseas journals, the doctors kept abreast with current trends in
Europe, especially Britain.8 Thev also had close contact with medical
practitioners in other parts of South Africa. In 1898 twentv-five (probably half)
of the Johannesburg doctors joined the newly-founded South African Medical
Association and hosted the organisation's first conference held in September that
year.9 It cannot therefore be'argued that a lack of knowledge dictated their
methods of practice.
The following examples show that the pioneer doctors were motivated, ambitious
and generally of high calibre. Kendall Franks, a distinguished and innovative
Irish surgeon, had glowing credentials and a fine practice even before he came to
the Transvaal because of nis wife's ill health. In 1904 he was knighted being the
first South African doctor who was not a politician to receive this honour. Apart
from private practice, he was honorary consultant to the Johannesburg hospital.
He was also the major player in bringing about the establishment in the Transvaal
of a branch of the British Medical Association and. when the South African Branch
was formed, he was elected as its first president.*0 Edward T. Hamilton, also a
surgeon and 'one of the most brilliant Guv's men of his day' (in 1895). conceived
and"initiated the Transvaal Medical Journal (in 1905) which he edited for several
years, while still in general practice.11
When Milner needed to reform the health conditions of African workers he drew on
the experience of other earlv-dav doctors with equally impressive credentials.
These included William H. Brodie. a graduate of Aberdeen, and Louis G. Irvine and
Donald Macaulav. both graduates of Edinburgh. All had noteworthy careers and were
prolific writers on a wide range of medical subjects. Together with several other
pioneer doctors. Macaulav entered the political arena during responsible
government, and he was elected to the Union House of Assembly in 1910. Irvine, an
RD as earlv as 1901. became a leading specialist in the field of occupational
health, more particularly silicosis.12
Not onlv did the Transvaal doctors have considerable medical skills, but thev
also brought with them British attitudes towards medicine in general, and towards
occupational and industrial health in particular. These influenced their handling
of medical issues on the Rand, particularly the problem of silicosis among white"
miners.
Silicosis is an incurable, often fatal, occupational disease caused bv prolonged
exposure to dust containing fine microscopic silica (quartz) particles. This Iune
disease has several manifestations, of which two are relevant: in its simple form
it may develop slowly, in which case it is chronic: or it mav advance rapidlv.
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and is called accelerated silicosis. Neither form is infectious or contagious,
but both to varying decrees cause physical impairment, and both reduce the
sufferer's resistance to lung infections. When other lung diseases, particularly
tuberculosis, occur in association with a relatively advanced form of silicosis,
a new illness becomes superimposed on the old one, and is called progressive
massive fibrosis. This disease, formerlv known as 'complicated silicosis', is
always disabling and is invariably lethal.13
Nineteenth-centurv doctors in Britain (as well as those in Europe and many other
parts of the world) were familiar with chronic silicosis, an aee-old lung
complaint amone workers in dustv occupations.14 It was so commonplace among
Cornish tin miners that doctors in Britain (as well as employers and successive
governments) took the disease entirely for granted as one of the occupational
hazards associated with metal mining.13 Such dismissiyeness was entirely
compatible with their nonchalant approach to the working class. They assumed,
quite wrongly, that workers had complete freedom to choose their occupations and
in so doina took into account the accompanying risks.16 By contrast, miners
were fatalistic. They anticipated short working lives, and premature death at an
average age of fifty'.17 Being fatalistic enabled miners to cope with the apathy
of the controlling parties and the grim choice that confronted sllicotics. •
either thev could'give up their work" 'in the very earliest stages of the illness*
(the only advice which the medical profession could offer)19 and face the
prospect of unemployment, possibly starvation;20 or they could continue working
until the inevitable overtook them.
Government statistics confirmed the miners' morbid expectations. During the early
1880s the highest death rate from occupational disease occurred among Cornish tin
miners; in each age group between twenty-five and fifty-five their mortality was
on average six tiraes'higner than that of fishermen (who had a low death rate) and
three times higher than'that of coal and ironstone miners.21 This, despite the
fact that bv 1880 medical research had already established the cause of silicosis
and wavs to prevent the disease: the use of water (to wet the dust at the point
of production); and the provision of effective ventilation (to disperse the
residual dust).22 Such safeguards, particularly the use of water, had been
effectively employed in the 1870s. when rock drillers excavated the St Gotthard
Tunnel through the Alps between Switzerland and Italy;25 and the same was true
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when the Simplon Tunnel was constructed in the 1890s.2*
The reasons for the apathy of the state, the employers and health officers
towards the plight of metal miners in Britain do not concern us here. What is
important is that British doctors transported to South Africa their indifference
to a non-contagious working-class illness. And coincident with the arrival of
doctors in the Transvaal, technologies were introduced on the Witwatersrand Rold
mines which substantially heightened the already considerable dust densities. In
the absence of dust preventives, the new machine drills, together with huge
labour-intensive squads, produced conditions that were conducive to a more
dangerous form of silicosis; accelerated silicosis maimed and killed machine
operators, known as rock drillers, within seven years of their commencing work.
Bv turning a blind eve to the industry's failure to protect its workforce, the
Witwatersrand medical profession condoned the disablement and premature death of
hundreds of miners.
The economic context
This socio-medical setting in the Transvaal was strongly influenced by economic
circumstances; in particular the nature of the industrialisation process on the
mines, including the division of the workforce along black-white racial lines.
The industry's production methods and employment practices, instituted during the
Transvaal republican era (1892 to 1899) under the presidency of Paul Kruger,
continued to be implemented, albeit with added vigour, throughout the
reconstruction era under Milner and his successors (1902 to 1907), and during the
period of Transvaal responsible government under Het Volk with Louis Botha and
Jan Smuts at the helm (1907 to 1910). Indeed, so strong were the pioneer
industrial structures that they remained in force from the establishment of the
Union of South Afrira in 1910, also under the political leadership of Botha and
Smuts, right up to the outbreak of World War One in 1914.
Following the discovery in the earlv 1880s of small-scale gold deposits in the
eastern Transvaal, beginning in 1885 the huge finds on the Witwatersrand were
made. The 19th centurv had witnessed a world-wide expansion of gold production.
After the 1849 Californian eold rush, new gold deposits were found in many other
parts of the USA, in Australia (in New South Wales and Victoria), in New Zealand
(in Queensland), in Canada (in the Klondike), and in South America, and in
Alaska. In similar vein. Russian gold mining steadily expanded eastward from the
Urals to Siberia.zs Not surprisingly, the value of the world's total gold
production rose sharply: from six million pounds in 1849 to thirty million in
I860.26 Yet the most important gold strikes were unquestionably those of the
Witwatersrand. Bv 1895. within a mere ten years of their discovery, the Transvaal
had become the world's top gold producer. Gold from the single region of the
Witwatersrand. valued at approximately eight and a half million pounds, yielded
roughly one-fifth of the globe's total annual gold output.27
This massive output was achieved for two reasons: the unique nature of the
deposits: and the use of 'scientific* techniques to exploit the gold. The
deposits were huge and extensive. On the surface, the quartz outcrops, in which
the beds of gold had been first discovered, stretched in a reasonably straight
east-west line for approximately 40 miles. It was also soon found that payable
gold persisted at depth, on a gentlv sloping plane, for at least five miles to
the south of the outcrops.23 Not onlv were these ore deposits far larger and
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more extensive than those in any other auriferous area in the world, they were
also more reeular and more uniform. With iustification a contemporary mining
expert marvelled: 'Compared with the Rand conglomerates, all other gold-mines are
but sporadic little flukes.'29
In 1892 the industry began 'to take off largelv because of two findings that
occurred almost simultaneously: the confirmation that payable gold existed at
depth: and the proof that pyritic ores, which up to this point had been
refractory, yielded 90 per "cent of the gold when treated with the newly developed
MacArthur-Forrest cyanide process.30 Financed by British, French and, to a
lesser extent. German capital, the mineowners reconstructed the original
rudimentary outcrop mines and developed the so-called deep level mines.
The mines were organised under a group corporate structure, most mines falling
under one of nine minine houses. It was throueh these mining houses that venture
capital was raised on the share market of the world. The London-based private
company, Wernher, Beit and Company, controlled two of the mining houses, H.
Eckstein and Company (its holdings were largely outcrop mines), and Rand Mines.
Limited (its holdings were deep level minesT, a subsidiary of Eckstein's. This
finance company, known locally as the Corner House, was bv far the largest
corporation.31 The nine mining houses financed and administered the scientific
exploitation of the mines, both outcrop and deep level, by underground mining
techniques applicable to deep, hard-rock mines.
This transformation of the industry was effected bv best-practice technology,
brought to the Witwatersrand from all over the world by highly paid mining
professionals, amongst whom US nationals predominated. Many of these experts had
both academic skills and world-wide practical experience. Such professional
expertise was linked to the 19th century global proliferation of metal mines,
especially gold, tin, iron, and copper. Improved ore-extraction techniques
together with technological strides in all the associated mining and engineering
sciences not only boosted the productive capacities of the new-found mineral
deposits, but also enabled them to be mined at far greaLer depths than
before.3S
The Witwatersrand underground mines required a much larger workforce than the
earlier rudimentary mines. This was not simplv because the mines were enlarged. A
more important reason for laree-scale production was the mineowners'
determination to mine low grade pyritic ore at a profit. The Witwatersrand ore
fluctuated between high, medium and low grades, but its average was a mere 6,5
dwts. (pennyweights) per ton. This was far less than the average values of 12
dwts. per ton being mined in Australia and North America. The mineowners might
have found it easier to make profits by 'picking the eyes' of the mines. They
were not. however, prepared to mine selectively: it would mean abandoning vast
low grade reserves: it would shorten the lives of the mines: and it would
possibly make the capital costs of opening and developing new mines
unjustifiable. Instead, they decided to mine richer ores in conjunction with
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poorer ones, and so 'get every ounce of gold which is in the ground out of
i t 1 . "
The profitable mining of low grade ore was extremely difficult durine this
period, when most of the world was on a gold standard. Although the demand for
gold was unlimited, the gold price was fixed, and any increase in the cost of
gold production reduced profits or even made some gold deposits too costlv to
work. Under such conditions the Witwatersrand industry could be viable only if
hupe tonnages were milled: nearly three tons of ore had to be excavated and
processed to extract a single ounce of gold. The profitability of the gold mines
therefore depended not only on the yield of gold per ton, but also on the working
costs per ton of ore. Thus'mass production and reduced working costs became the
primary objectives of the industry. And it was to these idols that the entire
hierarchy of management deferred: the directors of the nine mining houses; the
consulting engineers; and the mine managers.
Had these extremelv difficult ore bodies been situated anywhere else in the
world, it is quite possible that they would not have been' developed. Yet on the
Witwatersrand the combination of capital, mining house structure, technology, and
labour, was uniquely organised so that they could be exploited profitably.
Dividends paid by the Witwatersrand mines often did not live up to investor
expectations, and many believed this was because the mining houses retained a
very high proportion of the profits. But as the economist."Professor S. H.
Frahkel. has since calculated, the retention of profit between 1887 and 1914
amounted to a mere 2.1 per cent.33 The relatively low dividend returns on gold
explain why the mineowners constantly griped about their difficulties in raising
fresh or additional capital, and why tfiey were obsessed with reducing their
working costs, especially those associated with labour.
The workforce: particularly underground workers
As both black and white underground mineworkers were far more prone to disease
and death than their counterparts who worked on the surface, the composition,
size and labour arrangements of the underground workforce need discussion. This
begins with a note on terminology.
'Mineworkers1 is the generic term for wage-earners on a mine. In the past social
scientists tended to apply the term solely to white wage-earners. Today it is
also applied to the African workforce. (The terms. African or black, distinguish
these workers from their white counterparts.)
At the turn of the 20th century African mineworkers were officially called
'natives'. 'labourers'. 'kaffirs' and 'boys'. The term 'coloureds'' was ambiguous.
Occasionally it specified Africans, while at other times it covered all members
of the industry's workforce who were not white: it was used inclusively to denote
Africans (blacks), Indians, Chinese, and so-called 'coloureds'. Almost 80 per
cent of the African workforce was employed underground.36 It was among these
workers that the disease death rate, particularly from pneumonia and
tuberculosis, was most severe.37
In agreement with earlier usage, this paper refers to the industry's white
workforce as 'mineworkers1. 'workers', 'workmen' and 'men1. The word
'mineworkers' covers a wide spectrum of white waee-earners: the skilled
professional miners and the nominally semi-skilled trammers (responsible for ore-
removal tasks), together with the skilled artisans and the semi-skilled machine
operatives.
The Witwatersrand mines employed far more artisans proportionally than did mines
in other parts of the world, instead of subcontracting jobs to outside
engineering firms, which was common practice elsewhere, the Witwatersrand mines
had huge workshops employing large numbers of craftsmen.38 On the Rand
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therefore artisans outnumbered miners by at least two to one.39 Although a
substantial number of artisans worked underground either on a temporary or on a
permanent basis, they nevertheless regarded"themselves as surfacemen.40
The expressions 'miners' and 'mineworkers' should not be used interchangeably.
The term 'mineworkers' embodied all erades of white labour, whereas 'miners' were
specialists in mining operations. The miners were a separate professional
category of workmen who, apart from their distinctive training and tasks, had few
common interests with most other underground workmen (chiefly artisans and semi-
skilled operatives) and even less with surfacemen. The miners comprised
approximately one-third of the total white workforce and just over half the
underground white workforce.41 The disease death rate among the white workforce
was on average relatively low.42 But it was extremely high among one discrete
segment, the'miners. Huge numbers of them were afflicted by silicosis.43
Ever since the inception of the industry, management (following the precedent of
deep diamond mining at Kimberley) deploved its workforce on black-white racial
lines, a divide which it justified by the level of skills that each race
initially possessed. Highly paid overseas professional miners, the vast majority
of whom were British-born* supervised unskilled African migrant workers. The
black workers, who came from virtually all the southern African regions, but
especially from the Portuguese East African territories, south of Latitude 22°
south - the so-called 'East Coasters' - earned wages which were a fraction of
those earned bv white workmen.44
To iustify these labour arrangements the Randlords quoted the Social Darwinist
concept of evolution with its ancillary of black racial inferiority, which was
claimed to be a biologically determined condition. This plausible theory held
wide sway at the timet and its numerous adherents included Europeans (and persons
of European descent) belonging to all classes and professions.4* The notion of
white racial supremacy found fertile ground in South Africa with its relatively
lengthy experience of" slave owning and its legacy of 17th century Calvinist
doctrines. Nor was the British Colonial Office immune to such theories. Its
commitment to ostensibly commendable principles of duty and trusteeship towards
the African peoples under its governance was more often than not rhetorical.
Indeed, such paternalism, used to iustify British imperialism, was redolent of
Social Darwinism.4* Accordingly, supporters of the industry, including doctors,
endorsed the views of Hennen Jennings, the American consulting engineer to the
largest mining company, the Corner House:
The history of this country [the Transvaal], as well as that of
others where white and black are thrown together, clearly proves that
the white is the superior race mentally, and that the black should
recognise it. In other words it is the natural attitude of the white
man €o feel his superiority, and relegate to the black the lower
grade of manual work...
Thus, to obtain the maximum population, intelligence and contentment,
work among the whites must be confined to skilled departments where
brain tells, and the mere muscular work apportioned to races willine
to be considered inferior, and to work cheerfully for wages far below
the scale required by the white population to support their families
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in the condition of affairs obtaining in this country.47
The ever-erowing supply of skilled whites and unskilled African workers matched
the rapid expansion of the industry. In 1893 there were approximately A.000 white
and 29,000 black mineworkers, whereas in 1899 they totalled 11,000 and
97.000.48 Except in 1899. on the eve of the Anglo-Boer War, when the ratio of
blacks to whites was as high as nine to one, the 1893 ratio of seven to one was
constant for most of the pre-war period. And in 1905. when the industry re-
attained its pre-war production levels, this ratio once again became the
norm.49 Seven to one was not: however, the rule either on the surface or
underground. On the surface it was approximately four to oneT whereas undergroundit was roughly twelve to one.90 The bulk of the workforce was therefore
employed underground.
No mining centre in the world could boast of mines which on average employed
workforces of comparable size with those of the seventy-nine Witwatersrand mines
that were producing in 1899. In the early 1890s, at the peak of its copper
production, the celebrated Anaconda Mining Croup of Butte towered above all other
US mining operations, yet, despite its 3000 employees, and its acclaimed output,
the Anaconda was only a 'medium1 size operation by Witwatersrand standards. The
same contrast was true of British metal mines: a mine considered to be 'small1 on
the Witwatersrand was 'enormous' in comparison with a mine ranked as 'big' in
Britain. Sl
More important than the size of the underground workforce was the way it was
organised. Mass-production techniques were implemented so efficiently that on
each mine the underground workers were mobilised more like soldiers than factory
hands. Under white supervision, gangs of twenty to thirty African hand-drillers,
or parties of five African rock drillers manning two machines, prepared the holes
for blasting by the professional miner. Likewise, ore-removal tasks were
performed by large squads of Africans under the direction of the white semi-
skilled gangers. Such arrangements, which promoted 'speeding up', were unique, as
a Witwatersrand mine manager illustrated:
There is no comparison between Cornish mining and ours, in fact there
is no comparison in the wide world with the Rand. We get through more
ground here in a week than most miners in other countries do in a
month. Here it is push and drive and worry from the time the shift
goes down until it is up again, whilst in other mining centres there
is mostly ample leisure to do things in a more deliberate manner.52
This concentrated mining, this combination of labour-intensive methods and
powerful machines drills, produced dangerous silica dust and poisonous gases in
quantities at least 'ten times* in excess of those produced in metalliferous
mines in England (and probably elsewhere).33 Similarly, the large teams, in
which workers laboured in close proximity to one another, encouraged the spread
of infectious diseases far more rapidly than in other mining centres, where
miners worked in small solitary parties or in pairs. Although the Witwatersrand's
workforce was divided into two groups by race and colour, by different control
mechanisms, and by artificial definitions of skills, which were the bases for
wage differentials, black and white mineworkers nevertheless shared the
singularly unhealthy underground workplace.
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Hygiene on the mines during the Kruger era: ventilation; sanitation; and change
nouses
During the Kruger era the poor ventilation and the almost complete absence of
sanitation facilities heightened the incidence of silicosis and exacerbated the
spread of infectious diseases. All this was compounded by the dearth of efficient
change houses.
The republican ventilation laws, like the European and British measures on which
they were based, were designed to prevent fiery accidents. Accordingly; their
intention was to supply the underground workings with fresh air sufficient to
dilute noxious and inflammable gases, and to remove the vitiated air.94 The
detailed laws framed to meet these requirements were 'eminently reasonable', even
by today's standards.3S But the problem was that they were never enforced.3*
Relying'on the assurances of management, the republican Department of Mines
presumed that the natural ventilation of the mines was as effective on the
witwatersrand as it was in metalliferous mining districts elsewhere in the
world.57 Such confidence was misplaced: the Witwatersrand's climate and
altitude caused the natural ventilation of the gold mines to be largely
ineffective.59
Certain mining engineers acknowledged the critical absence of air. particularly
in the blind ends of development tunnels, and advised that supplementary
mechanical ventilation be installed.3* But the mineowners ignored the
confidential recommendations of their own experts, because It 'would have meant
an increase in working costs'.*0 If anyone thoroughly understood the situation,
it was surely the former British mining inspector who had himself framed the
republican ventilation laws. Many, especially miners, endorsed his indictment of
the mineowners' parsimony:*1 'The blind ends cannot strictly be said to be
ventilated in the spirit of the...regulations'.**
Before the Anglo-Boer War. the sanitation of the mines was equallv deplorable. As
there was no medical official to supervise health conditions on the mines, the
sanitary arrangements were left entirely to management, who did nothing about
them.63 None of the outcrop mines and only a sprinkling of deep level mines had
'privy accommodation'. Against the expectations of management, miners would not
(or could not) avail themselves of the remote surface latrines. Instead, they
relieved themselves - and Africans followed suit - in the disused workings and
the ore-boxes, which were nearby.64 This caused excreta to be 'constantly
brought in contact with the employees': it was mixed with the ore raised from the
mine; it was blended with the water circulating through the mine; and it mingled
with the water pumped to the surface for use on the sorting floors, mills, and
M
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other workings.*3
The virtual absence of hygienic facilities exacerbated the harmful effects of the
odious sanitation. Following European and British precedent, the Kruger
government enacted a law stipulating the provision of change houses:** suitably
warmed buildings, equipped with amenities and ablution facilities, in which
workmen could change and dry their workclothes. But as the law was not enforced
(there was no penalty for its infringement), it was meaningless. Only a
smattering of mineowhers built 'efficient ones'.67 Most, for reasons'of cost,
refused to provide change houses voluntarily.
Change houses for Africans, even if they were onlv bare sheds, were a rarity. Nor
did fhe law did stipulate their provision. As the Africans wore only a loin cloth
at. work, state officials (and management) believed that they did not need the
facilitv.*a
In the absence of change houses, and without conveniences to dry their clothes in
their living quarters, miners were forced to wear sodden clothing to and from
work. Not surprisingly, they regularly caught colds, the consequences of which
were often serious, sometimes fatal: the colds irritated the lungs, and
heightened the miners' vulnerability to pneumonia and tuberculosis. These were
especially dangerous infections, if the lungs were already severely damaged by
dust. The miners' wet: dirty and 'perhaps faecally contaminated working clothes',
usually stinking of nitrous fumes, polluted their living quarters, which in their
own right were often a major source of a variety of infections.**
Living conditions on the mines
The underground disease problems caused by deficient ventilation, unhealthy
sanitation and the absence of hygienic amenities, were compounded by the poor
living conditions of both black and white mineworkers. They, too. provided
conditions that were conducive to the spread of infectious" diseases, notably
pneumonia and tuberculosis. Although the accommodation of whites was superior to
that of Africans, white mineworkers. particularly miners, certainly did"not enjoy
salubrious living facilities.
Most Africans were poorly housed and badly fed in the barrack-like compounds. A
doctor, who thought their overcrowded living conditions were conducive to
pneumonia epidemics, described them to illustrate his point:
They [15.000 natives] were housed, as is the usual rule, in
compounds, in huts built round the four sides of a space. The huts
were all of one type and were practically all under one long roof
interrupted here and there. They were divided laterally from each
other by galvanised iron partitions. Each hut opened oh the space by
a doorway. Space for ventilation was obtained by the back wall not
being carried quite up to the roof, which provided a fair cross
draught. The sleeping bunks [approximately 50 to a hut] were round
the walls, away from the door, in two tiers. Very little sunlight and
not much diffuse daylight gained access to the interior of the huts
except through the low pitched doorway.70
The 'single' men. so lodged, were usually migrant workers, who served short
contracts ranging from three months to a year, at the end of which time they
returned to tfieir rural homesteads.
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Little provision was made for African married men who had their families with
them. Almost every company supported a tiny group of them in the so-called
'locations' adjacent to each mine. A number of location dwellers were 'lone-
service' Africans, who stayed on the mines for three years and longer.71 The
'long-service' Africans, most of whom were 'East Coasters', were spared the
congested, often vermin-infested, dormitories, which promoted the spread of
infections.72 But, like the white miners, they were vulnerable to silicosis
because of their lengthy and continuous exposure to intense dust densities,73
The maiority of white miners were also 'single* and transient workers. The most
important reason for this form of existence'was the problem of housing. The
rentals for private lodgings were exorbitant compared with those at mining
centres elsewhere in the world,74 and company housing, though cheap, was
insufficient for the demand. Although the industry provided tiny, crude, two-
room, semi-detached cottages for married men, they were not only in very short
supply, but they were also rarely made available to miners, as opposed to
artisans.7S
Most miners therefore had no option but to fall back on the so-called 'single
quarters' which afforded enough rooms for the industry's entire white workforce,
provided they were single.76 These were tacky wood and iron dormitories 'dumped
upon the bare red earth without a single tree or shrub to give anv idea of
privacy..,Cor] to hide [their] hideous nakedness'. The barrack-like buildings,
laiye oblong boxes roughly 80 yards in length, were divided in two down the
middle, with each half partitioned into approximately twenty rooms. Two men, at a
nominal cost of 5s. or 10s. each per month, shared the tiny bare rooms: they were
unfurnished, except for beds, and had no amenities such as running water, stoves,
and heating.77 A miner complained: 'They are not much better than the compound.
They are built about 12 ft. x 12 ft., and there is no height to speak of - about
10 ft.'7a
More important than their lack of comfort and physical repulsiveness, the 'single
quarters' were exceptionally unhygienic: the 'wretched' rooms were badly
ventilated and infested with insects and vermin.79 As the workmen correctly
recognised, they were as deadly a source of infections, particularly
tuberculosis, as were the underground workings.
A feature of migrancy. which the overseas professional miners shared with their
African counterparts, was their propensity when sick or dying to return home to
be cared for by their kin. Like the African migrants who died anonymously in the
countryside, many white miners were laid to rest in the 'Kraals of the North' in
Britain.90 The desire to be healed 'at home' was the common response of both
black and white mineworkers to the poor health and medical care that they
71
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received on the Witwatersrand.
Health care during the Kruper era: the state; the industry; and the medical
prote3sion
During the 1890s, the controlling parties - the state, management, and the
medical profession - were well aware that there were serious health issues
connected with the industry. Yet all three bodies were impervious to them,
because the problems neither impeded the growth of the industry nor disrupted the
flow of labour, particularly African. The government of Krueer', cognisant of the
industry's financial importance to the Transvaal, nurtured Ehe industry in many
ways even from its infancy.81 In fact, the industry's growth was closely linked
to' state protection.82 But such mutually dependent connections did not restrict
the Republican government from liberally enacting industrial legislation for the
benefit of the white workforce.83 Had miners recognised the urgent need for
health legislation, especially dust preventive measures, it is "conceivable that
the Kruger government would have responded sympathetically.fl*
Such support did not, however, extend to the black workforce. The state consigned
its welfare to the equally indifferent mineowners. Belatedly in May 1899, shortly
before the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War, the Randlords considered reforming the
health standards in the compounds.83 But an improvement in the living standards
of the Africans was not their primary motive. Rather, it was to prevent the
industry being crippled by an invasion of plague in the compounds. This fear was
provoked by tfie outbreak of the disease at Delagoa Bay, the departure point for
almost half the black migrant mineworkers.8* The industry, as we shall later
see. always acted promptly and without thought of expense, when outbreaks of
infectious diseases threatened the entire white community.
Throughout this pre-war era of rapid industrial growth, the doctors, who were
professionally committed to medical care: were passive about its neglect in theindustry. The 1894 and 1898 pneumonia epidemics among the Africans on the mines
aroused the curiosity of several part-time mine doctors, who performed a number
of post mortems to ascertain their causes. But their findings which focussed on
isolating the responsible germ, did not at all establish measures for preventing
subsequent epidemics with equally serious loss of life.a7 All the same, their
associates praised the paper presented at the South African Medical Congress held
in Johannesburg in 1898.
Like their overseas colleagues, the Transvaal doctors were narrowly concerned
with finding medical cures^ more particularly vaccines or therapies for
germs.Bfl World-wide, doctors did not, at this time, enjoy a high status in the
community, and they therefore hoped that this type of research would promote
public honour and respect:89 like that which occurred when Robert Kocn
discovered the tubercle bacillus in the 1880s.90 The passionate sentiments of a
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contemporary research doctor vividly depict the enthusiasm for this kind of
research:
The idea of saving a great country [South Africa] from being
sacrificed to an infectious disease [tuberculosis] is a glorious one,
and worthy of every effort we can possibly make. Should we fail, no
blame can attach oh the score of indifference or inaction.*1
Likewise, the Transvaal medical profession was clearly far more interested in
defeating disease quickly through the new and exciting science of bacteriology
than through applying long-term hygienic preventive measures, which seemed
mundane by comparison. In any event, recommendations involving the application of
general hygienic precautions would have brought the Transvaal doctors into
conflict with the mineowners. Improved sanitation and ventilation, the 19th
century (and early 20th century) corner-stones of good hygiene,92'would have
incurred additional expenses for the industrial controllers at a time when their
well publicised goal was to contain mining costs.
The Transvaal medical profession's response to the problem of silicosis among
white miners was equally indifferent. Following British precedent, they paid no
attention to chronic silicosis which was habitual among miners. A more serious
omission, however, was their response to accelerated silicosis. The advent of
this new form of the disease occurred on the Rand round about 1898. It afflicted
not only middle-aged miners but also the young, aged about thirty."3 Although
doctors recognised that this was a more dangerous and deadlv form of the disease,
they failed to alert either the mining authorities or the miners to its serious
implications. Nor did they issue a single cautionary warning about the well known
dangers of dust and its methods of prevention. Instead, they took the least line
of resistance: they merely advised their patients to stop working.*4 For most
miners such prescription was too late; they died in obscurity either in South
Africa or in Britain, if they could afford the passage home.95 Had it not been
for the intervention of the Anelo-Boer War, the neglect of silicosis might well
have continued for very much longer.
Medical practice on the Witwatersrand after the Anglo-Boer War
After the war ended, many British doctors emigrated to the Witwatersrand, where
they joined their colleagues who had reopened'their pre-war practices. But most
of those who had hoped 'to make thousands a year1 were 'sadly disappointed*.
Within a short time there were too many doctors. Because the profession was
'overstocked1, doctors on the Rand were forced to depend 'either largely or
entirely, on t part-time] appointments, either Government or mine1 . The iew
doctors who obtained government billets, including positions as district
surgeons, did 'well1. But most doctors had no option but to relv on part-timejobs on the mines.96
As a professional group. South African doctors, as mentioned, had a relatively
low economic and social standing. But on the Witwatersrand, where wealth and
status tended to coincide, most doctors claimed that their status was actually
inferior to that of their colleagues elsewhere in the country.97 Their reliance
on mine appointments, where the mine doctor was 'verv much at the mercy of the
Manager'. further diminished their independence and standing. Mine managers
asserted arrogantly that they could 'easily get rid of doctors who did not toe
91
 temsbattan. A, t . . 'The threateried conquest oi Soutn Africa r>v :ae Daciiks txjoe'D^icsis', Tj$3, i Aug. 1905. a. 12.
92
 Anderson. ft. M,. Historical studies of the aeveicoiBit of i s o l a t i o n tor imuriois and dsnaeraus trades in England', in s ir T.
Oliver, eel.. Dangerous trases; the historical, ax i a l and leosl aspects of industrial occupations as affecting health, by a punter of
experts {uandon. 1902). D. 38.
93
 ft;F€. 1902-1905, pp. 24- 26, qq. 131-161 passim, dr ti. G. Rcaers; SO 10, 1912. report of the Select S w a t t e e on Mings'
Phthisis Bill, 1912, p. v a i . appmdij: C.
** 9C 10. 1912. pp. 147-148. q. 1116, ft. Barry.
93
 ftfift, li Decsifaer, 1901. p. 1: Lcndcn Mining Journal, 23 i\bv. 1901. p, 1468, letter: The Tines, 13 Oct. 1902, let ter .
*• fritish Medical jgrnai (ffltf), 3 June i9C6. p. i232; Sttfl, i l too. 1917, p. 237; Laxet , 4 Are 190*. pp. i61C>-l611: Native
arievances inqulr-/, transcript of evidence (Johamesbu^ reference library), 2 Feb. 1914, p. 60, 5. A. H. Friichars.
*"• Franks. Sir K.. 'The position of the metiicai profession in South Africa', South African ffedical fecgrri. 25 Dec. 1909. p. I l l :
THL Ifev 1908. pp. 2'3S-249. kn, 1911. p, 15.
1 3
the line and 'find plenty of [compliant] doctors to replace them'.98
On some mines one part-time doctor attended to both African and white patients,
while on others two part-time doctors each had racially distinct practices:*9
the white mineworkers usually elected their own doctor from the mine benefit
society panel, but the doctor for the black mineworkers was appointed by the mine
manager, who regarded him as 'an unavoidable ev i l ' . Almost every mine doctor was
an unsaiaried professional who worked for 'so much per head'; and every mine
doctor was dependent on the 'patronage', not of the company directors,'but of the
mine manager. o o
To safeguard their positions doctors often compromised their medical standards to
accommodate the economic needs and wishes of the industry. They accepted
positions in which management put no restriction on their case loads* and
sanctioned sub-standard nursing of their patients in the mine hospitals. On many
mines, for instance, the part-time doctor was responsible for the health of no
less than 2000 Africans in addition to the white members of the benefit
societies.1 0 1 Not surprisingly, the medical services for both black and white
mineworkers were often hopelessly inadequate.
The public insinuation that mine doctors were biassed in favour of their
employers did not at al l allow for the complexities of their situation.102
This was understood by a mine inspector who illustrated that some doctors had a
genuine conflict of interests;
Mine doctors will rather accept existing conditions than jeopardize
their positions by suggesting drastic and expensive improvements. I
have had complaints from mine doctors as to [the workmen's housing
accommodation on the mines and the treatment extended to the miners
in cases of sickness or disease], but such complaints have always
been accompanied by the request that I should not state that the
complaint, or the opinion expressed, came from them.103
In 1906 there were 181 doctors on the Witwatersrand. Of these 146 practised in
Johannesburg and i ts immediate environs, and the remaining thirty-rive either on
the far east or the west Rand.104 Most belonged to the Transvaal Medical
Association.103 and at least thirty on average attended the organisation's
monthly meetings, where they took care of professional matters, and presented and
discussed problematic medical cases.
It is difficult to establish precisely the average annual income of the
Witwatersrand doctors. A senior mine inspector received an annual salary of
£1500, 10A whereas senior medical officers of healthy also employed by the
government, often received less; their annual salaries usually ranged from
approximately £800 to £1250.1O7 The starting remuneration for an ordinary,
full-time state medical post was approximately £450 per annum (25s. per
day).100 For the Witwatersrand, with i ts high cost of living, this was a very
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low salary. (A married artisan, who had his family with him, could barelv subsist
on his annual wage of approximately £3AO)-109 There were therefore few
applicants for such positions; doctors could make far more in private practice,
even if they had to cut their fees.110
The average annual ceiling for the earnings of established doctors could not have
exceeded £1500; in 1904, when the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, the
Chamber's recruitina arm. advertised a full-time medical post (with residence) at
this salary, there were ninety-four applicants for the job.111 And in 1905
there was the same fierce competition when the Corner House created eight full-
time mine posts (with residence);112 the four senior doctors, each responsible
for a group of two or three mines, received £1800 per annum, whereas the fourjunior doctors, who had similar responsibilities, received £1000.113 It can
therefore be assumed that the annual earnings of doctors in private practice
averaged £1000.114
Not only did the doctors attain these earnings through 'time, patience and hard
work' in their full-time private practices, but also through stretching their
capacities in their part-time posts.113 By 1914 the entire industry,
consisting of sixty-three producing mines, had only ten full-time medical
officers Tfour were employed by the Corner House) who were in charge of eighteen
mines. Consequently the remaining forty-five mines were attended by thirty-four
part-time doctors.11* The industry did not establish a standard system for
paying part-time doctors, and mine managers used market forces to raise or lower
their fees.117 When times were depressed, doctors actually vied with one
another for an annual fee of only £50 (3s. Ad. per day), even though this meant
caring for 7000 to 8000 Africans.'10 ' '
The medical profession's responses to the disease death rate, especially from
pneumonia, among AITican mineworkera
It is against this background that we must view the responses of the
Witwatersrand medical profession to the post-war health crises in the industry.
In May 1901, with great celebration, three mines resumed production.1*9 But
after this progress was slow. By December one-quarter of the mines that had been
producing in 1889 were operative;120 and it was onlv in 1905 that the industry
managed fo reach its pre-war production levels.121 The main reason for the
industry's sluggishness was the shortage of black labour: at the end of 1902
there were A2,OO0 Africans compared with 97,000 in 1899.122 Africans withheld
their labour for a variety of reasons, the most important be ins the reduction of
their wages by one-third, a decision taken by the Chamber in 1900.i2S Although
the Chamber restored wages to their pre-war levels in 1903, it took several years
109
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before the Africans' confidence in the mines was restored sufficiently for them
to return in their pre-war numbers.124 In the meantime the mineowners*, with
the secret connivance of Milner, made arrangements to make good the shortfall of
unskilled workers by employing indentured Chinese labourers, who began to arrive
in 1904.
Starting in the winter of 1901 and continuing until the end of 1903, the
'abnormally high' mortality among African mineworkers, principally from disease,
intensified the unskilled labour shortage.123 This news, conveyed by newly
appointed health officials, disturbed Mtlner and Sir Godfrey Lagden, Commissioner
for Native Affairs.12* The high disease death rate was a problem in its own
right. But as important, it could jeopardise the state-industry plans regarding
Chinese labourers. As the Colonial Office made abundantly clear, the British
government would refuse to sanction their importation, unless the African death
rate was reduced to acceptable levels.127
Milner therefore instructed the Native Affairs Department, the government agency
responsible for 'controlling* and 'protecting* African mineworkers. to record the
specific death rate in the industry for each disease. Further, officials of this
department met representatives of the Chamber of Mines to discuss remedial health
measures. This meeting, plus later negotiations with the Transvaal Medical
Association, resulted in the appointment of a committee of mine doctors to
investigate the health conditions of Africans on the mines.128 The report of
the medical committee, adopted in September 1903, offered a number of detailed
recommendations for the betterment of compound sanitation, sleeping facilities,
diet, and so forth.129 Although the industry implemented most of the
improvements,130 it took at least a year before they bore any fruits.
In the first half of 1903 the death rate for African mineworkers was 62 per 1000
per annum; and during the second half of 1903 it rose to 80 per 1000 per annum.
Diseases accounted for 95 per cent of these deaths. Respiratory diseases were the
biggest killers being responsible for 58,34 per cent of the total death rate
(inclusive of accidents). Of these, pneumonia (50,83 per cent) and tuberculosis
(5,40 per cent) were the most deadly. By comparison, all other respiratory
diseases', including silicosis, were insignificant (2 per cent).
In the first half of 1904 the disease death rate dropped to 45 per 1000 per
annum, but it was still 'three times as high as that in England , and all the
more appalling' because it applied to 'males in the prime of life'. Milner (and
his medical advisers) was unmoved by this comparison. He rejected its suitability
on the ground that there was a 'very high' (but unknown) 'kraal' death rate: and
submitted that the disease mortality now halved, was proof that African health
care on the mines had been successfully reformed.131 His willingness to accept
this new level of mortality (higher than the medical reformers had hoped for)
indicated the close ties between the state and the mineowners; both were intent
on promoting the material prosperity of the industry.
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As in Kruger's time, so, too, during the reconstruction era, the state and the
industry were in many respects mutually dependent on one another. Yet from the
reconstruction period until responsible government in 1907, t h e Randlords
certainly exerted far more direct and indirect political influence than they had
done under the republican government. Their direct influence was especially
noticeable. For example, three leading mining house directors, who at various
times were presidents or the Chamber, were also influential politicians.132
Less obvious, though equally important, was the industry's indirect influence on
government through the Department of Native Affairs and the Department of Mines;
many officials at all levels in the hierarchy of both department had been
employed by the industry before the Anglo-Boer War.133 Because of their former
managerial experience with the mining nouses the senior personnel of both
departments favoured the industry at the expense of mineworkers and actively
promoted the industry's attempts to reduce working costs.
This priority was particularly evident among officials of the Department of
Mines, who complied with the many wishes of the Association of Mine Managers.
Mine inspectors 'liberally construed' the regulations to meet the 'present
circumstances'.1'4 They were reluctant, for example, to prosecute management;
in line with their policy of gentle persuasion they merely Issued warnings
instead of levying fines.1*5 Inspectorate warnings had very little Impact on
management, who continued to infringe the regulations with impunity.1'* Such
contempt for state controls extended to health regulations with adverse
consequences for mineworkers. Yet the Witwatersrand doctors did not protest. By
this omission the Transvaal medical profession condoned the actions of management
and the state, and was in effect, party to their transgressions.
The improvements recommended by the committee of mine doctors, many of which were
enacted as government regulations in 1906, were a source of pride to the medical
profession.T37 Yet in 1914 the visiting American consultant, Surgeon-General
w. C. Gorga3, reported that, notwithstanding the medical reforms, the new health
standards were still extremely poor.138 Goreas's criticisms and suggestions
were not made from the vantage of advances In medical science, and uiey were not
theoretical and merely academic. Nor was his approach strictly curative. Instead,
it was based largely on preventive principles which he had successfully applied
among the large and predominantly black workforce responsible for building the
Panama Canal. His conquest of disease won him world-wide acclaim, for between
1906 and 1912 he reduced the disease mortality rate on the Isthmus of Panama from
45 to 7 per 1000 per annum. During this process there was also a 'sudden and
permanent drop in the death rate from pneumonia': it fell from 18.4 to 2 per 1000
per annum.13' Gorgas's criticisms of the Witwatersrand targeted the Africans'
living conditions in the compounds and the quality of the care they received in
the mine hospitals, both of which areas had ostensibly been reformed in 1903 and
1905. The truth was, as Gorgas's sanitary innovations at Panama showed, that the
improvements were grossly inadequate by comparison with what was actually
required and with what could feasibly be achieved.
On the Witwatersrand, although the improved diet helped reduce the incidence of
scurvy, it was monotonous ana high in starch and deficient in vitamins, protein
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and fat: It was a maize (mealie meal) diet, usually served in the form of
porridge, and was varied only once or twice a week by small rations of meat and
vegetables, often of inferior quality. As a local German doctor (not part of the
British establishment) put it: '[The diet] was as insufficient as it was
unscientific.'140 The sleeping quarters, though better constructed than
before, continued to be dirty and over-crowded, and were poorly ventilated and
bitterly cold.l41
The mine hospital, often nothing more than an isolated room (or more
euphemistically, an 'enclosure'), frequently sheltered indisposed mineworkers on
'sleeping boards (not beds)' with 'wooden pillows'. All the disabled were
hospitalised together, no attempt being made to isolate patients with highly
infectious conditions from those suffering from traumatic disabilities, such as
minor abrasions.142 They were attended to in the main by unqualified
orderlies: 'a staff of ignorant boys';143 and convalescents were forced to
perform 'light [physical] work' without pay.144 Such conditions were not at
all conducive to recovery, as doctors were fully aware.1*8 Pneumonia, for
instance, required intensive nursing and even 'three months convalescence'
without any work whatsoever.144
Rather than face confinement in the hospitals, which they detested, indisposed
Africans tended to work until they * collapsed , or they left the mines
voluntarily ('deserted') and returned home. This was not simply because they had
a primitive and superstitious fear of hospitals per se, as doctors claimed.147
Instead, they were terrified of dying in isolation uncter circumstances that were,
to say the least, spartan and uncaring. On many mines, management was reluctant
to nurse the seriously ill. Rather than have their deaths reflected in the
industry's records, management expeditiously 'shunted' the sick and dying
Africans home on trains so that their rural dependents and communities could care
for or bury them.148
All these medical reforms had one thing in common: they were piecemeal, sub-
standard and saved the mineowners money. They were devised by a group of medical
professionals who were singularly conscious of the industry's 'present
circumstances'; after the initial, but temporary, post-war boom, the industry was
now in a slump (it lasted from 1903 to 1909) and needed to economise more than
ever before. The propensity of the medical profession to help the industry was
reinforced by yet another aspect of the mineowners1 propaganda: they managed to
convince the doctors that the community's material welfare depended not only on
the successful performance of the industry as a whole, but that it also hinged on
the profitability of the poorest and weakest low-grade producers.14* The cost
of health services to the poorer mines, and not to the industry as a whole,
therefore also greatly influenced the actions and decisions of the Witwatersrand
medical profession. The 1904 controversy regarding the compounds, which took
nearly a year to resolve, clearly illustrates this point.
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When George Turner, Transvaal Medical Officer of Health, prescribed that the
minimum ventilation standard in the Chinese (and African) compounds should be 300
cubic feet of air space per person, the Chamber objected on the ground of costs.
In arguing in favour of 200 cubic feet per person - a minimum advocated by the
committee of mine doctors - the Chamber showed that the difference in capital
costs between the two standards was as much as £5 per person. Such 'practical
reasons' subsequently influenced two medical investigations which sanctioned the
Chamber's demand: first, an informal enquiry by a sub-committee of the Transvaal
Medical Association: and second, a formal government commission, consisting
predominantly of medical doctors. The 'practical reasons' to which the medical
profession pandered, suited the budgets of the poorer mines and saved the
industry £2,250,000. Although the weight of Witwatersrand medical opinion was
against Turner, he clung tenaciously to his unpopular requirement, based on
British ventilation practices; his integrity, although vilified by the Chamber
and his colleagues as 'ignorance1, was vindicated, but only in 1914, when
Gorgas's report highlighted the inadequacies of the compound ventilation.190
The Witwatersrand doctors clearly modified medical standards to accommodate the
industry regarding the ventilation controversy. The medical profession took
seriously the implied threat of Harold Strange, President of the Chamber in 1904,
who warned that the enforcement of Turner's ventilation standard 'would greatly
affect the prosperity of the country', as many poor mines would not be able to
bear the cost of Chinese labourers.15* This was echoed by the Transvaal
Medical Journal. In an editorial it congratulated the commission on its 'just'
rHidings which favoured a 'more economical housing than that suggested by Dr.
Turner. At the same time it reminded its readers that the 'interests' of the
Witwatersrand medical profession, like a 'certain section' of the press, 'were
intimately woven with Transvaal prosperity in its widest sense1.*"
The medical profession was equally accommodating to the industry in matters
concerning underground health standards. Although such partiality seriously
affected the well-being of both black and white mineworkers, its consequences
were tragic for miners who, as we have seen, were extremely vulnerable to
silicosis.
The medical profession's responses to the mortality among miners from silicosis
As soon as the mines began producing in May 1901, mine managers discovered that
many of the finest pioneer rock drillers had either died abroad or at South
African coastal towns, where they had retreated when the war started. As an
informal Mines Department enquiry later showed, in the eighteen-month period
(from October 1899 to March 1901) 227 of the 1477 pre-war rock drillers (16,5 per
cent) had died as a result of intense dust exposure at an average age of
thirty-five years.133 These findings were confirmed, but only two years later,
when the investigative commission on silicosis, the Weldon Commission, presented
its report.134 Its appointment had been delayed - even resisted - because
neither Milner nor the Randlords wanted unfavourable publicity at this critical
juncture in the industry's history.155
Despite the huge prevalence of the disease among rock drillers as well as general
miners, and although the disablement and death or rock drillers occurred on
average after only seven years' work with the machines,13* yet another two
years elapsed before the government enacted specific regulations to prevent
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dust.137 Such dilatorines3 took no account of the medical profession's warning
to the Weldon Commission that silicosis on the Witwatersrand was 'more
fatal..*than in most other mining centres'.1S-
The anti-dust regulation promulgated in December 1905 were similar to those
enacted in Britain a year earlier, and provided for the compulsory use of water
during machine drilling and after blasting. Unlike the British ones, however,
they made no provision for the protection of general miners, as opposed to rock
drillers; they did not make the use of water compulsory in ore-removal jobs and
in all production tasks, including hammer drilling. To its credit the Transvaal
Medical Association formally protested these omissions to the government, but to
no avail.13'
Unlike the English measures, which were reasonably well implemented,1*0 the
ones on the Rand were a dead letter: the mineowners ignored the regulations, and
the state, which did not enforce them, actually withdrew them after only a few
months.1*1 The truth was that the cheap water devices, supplied by management,
were completely ineffective.162 The resistance of miners to using them was
understandable; the compulsory portable atomisers, which did not allay the dust,
created so much fog that they laid the miners open to contracting
pneumonia.1*3 Yet when both controlling parties failed to achieve any tangible
results, they blamed the workmen for their failure to comply with the dust
controls.'**
If the mineowners were not prepared to spend trifling sums for improving hygiene
(providing underground sanitation and building change houses), as the Weldon
Commission recommended, they were even less willing to bear the moderate costs
that the provision of water-pipes and fresh water entailed.1*9 It is therefore
scarcely surprising that in 1910, when the Mining Regulations Commission
(appointed in 19077 presented its final report, the mortality from silicosis had
not declined since 1903.'** In fact, both the incidence and prevalence of the
disease were on the increase.liT
In 1910 the official silicosis death rate was 11 per 1000 per annum amongst white
underground workers 'at ages of twenty and over'.^iH These figures (calculated
in 1907, but not updated in 1910) do not at all convey the overwhelming
predominance of the disease among a discrete group which constituted only half
the underground white workforce. Nor do they indicate that 'at least one-third
and probably a greater proportion of the disabled Rand miners left the country
1 5 7
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and died' invisibly at their homes abroad*li9 If these factors are taken into
account, the mortality of rock drillers was probably as high as 120 per 1000 per
annum and that of general miners (including rock drillers) 60 per 1000 per
annum. *7 °
Throughout this sorry period, the Witwatersrand medical profession did very
little to warrant congratulation. Up to the appointment of the Weldon Commission
in November 1902, the medical profession did not disclose the magnitude of the
problem to the press or even to their colleagues through the medium of any one of
the many medical journals, either local or overseas. Nor did the doctors produce
a single letter or article either as individuals or as a professional group
urging a commission.171 Yet during the period individual doctors consulted
with as many as 150 patients who nad contracted the new, accelerated form of the
disease.172 The doctors, like the press, succumbed to the fog of silence that
enveloped the Reef.
At the request of the miner's union in August 1902, a six-man committee from the
Transvaal Medical Association investigated the disease for two months, but then
did nothing with its report. The doctors failed to submit it to the government,
as they had promised the Transvaal Miners' Association to do. Nor did they
publish it. Though their conclusions criticised the industry's mining methods
only by implication, the doctors lacked the courage to circulate their findings -
perhaps fearing a hostile reception. Put bluntly, in the absence of any form of
objective and Topen discussion on the Rand, the doctors were too scared to
handle a 'notorious' problem independently. They were prepared to present their
report only to the Weldon Commission, because this provided official
sanction. •""
Such inertia contrasted sharply with the assertiveness of doctors in Britain to
the same problem, which they confronted when Witwatersrand miners returned home
during the war. Led by Sir Thomas Oliver, the renowned occupational health
specialist who practised in north England, a number of British doctors made a
concerted effort to rally the public press and medical and mining journals as
soon as peace was declared (in May 1902).I74 They wanted the appointment of a
Transvaal commission and the speedy institution of dust preventives on the gold
mines, even if the self-same remedies had to be applied to the tin mines in
Cornwall. Their petitions to the Colonial Secretary plus their organisation of a
Cornish parliamentary lobby forced Milner to capitulate and to appoint the Weldon
Commission.173 Their efforts did not stop at this point. Unlike their
Witwatersrand colleagues, the small band of health reformers in Britain continued
to agitate until anti-dust measures were eventually enacted in the
Transvaal.17A
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The Witwatersrand doctors certainly were capable of concerted action, as tl
reaction to the 'Lungsava* episode showed. The most popular quack medicine
their
a__ ^ _ _ _ 4 4. _. _ among
silicotic miners was"'Lungsava', a concoction including alcotiol and an indigenous
plant root used by the Africans as an emetic.177 Although the doctors
manufactured by a bogus doctor, and in 1906 and 1908 the Transvaal Medical
Council pressed charges against him for unlawfully practising as a doctor.179
Yet their motive for acting forcefully was not to protect the health of the
gullible miners, but rather to safeguard their professional standing.
Had the miners been dying of an infectious disease which placed the entire
community, especially whites, at risk, Milner and his officials would undoubtedly
have responded with a sense of urgency. This happened in 1904 when bubonic plague
broke out among the Fordsburc Indian community. Milner, who wasted no time and
spared no cost on that occasion, went to great lengths, even circumventing
regulations, to halt the epidemic and to prevent i ts recurrence.180 The state
responded similarly in 1905 and 1906, when small-pox epidemics threatened the
white community.181 The Witwatersrand doctors, who strongly supported the
state in all these instances, were unequivocally prepared to combat infectious
diseases - all sectors of the community, including those with wealth and power,
were vulnerable to germs! Both Milner and the medical profession regarded
silicosis in a different light: it was a working-class disease and non-
contagious. In their view i t warranted no attention and certainly no
advertisement.
These attitudes persisted and coincided with important changes in the industry's
production process. In 1905, when the industry had at last acquired an adequate
supply of unskilled African and Chinese labourers, the mineowners intensified
production. Before the Anglo-Boer War the mineowners had tended to mine
selectively: they chose richer ores, and overlooked poorer reserves.182 But
they now altered their policy and mined according to the average: all the
reserves were mined, even though some of the poorer ones ran as low as 4 dwts.
per ton.183 This was a risky policy because profitability hinged on the
attainment of yet more cost reductions and the further acceleration of
production.
In pursuit of these goals - additional tonnage at reduced costs - mine managers
encouraged miners to speed up, going so far as to 'clap their hands' when miners
flouted the regulations to exceed daily targets.184 Speeding up also caused
dust levels to increase dramatically, but without any ventilation controls. This
was because the ventilation regulations, suspended in 1903, were s t i l l under
discussion pending their reform, as recommended by the Weldon Commission.183
Sound ventilation, an effective preventive for many infections, and the finest
weapon against silicosis, was the most expensive health reform and therefore the
last to receive any attention on the Rand.18*
The other cornerstone of hygiene, underground sanitation, was equally neglected
by the mineowners and again for reasons of cost. This was so, notwithstanding
legislation for its provision in 1902, and the Weldon Commissions's
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recommendations for i t s betterment in 1903. Despite the introduction of
underground latrines, there were too few of them, and their condition was 'as
disgusting, as they were disgraceful and dangerous'.187 African and white
mineworkers refused to use them; they preferred the dark corners, which emitted
less of a stink and provided more privacy.1" Health officials blamed them for
doing so. and held them responsible for spreading and contracting diseases such
as dysentery and enteric fever.189 Such accusations were unfair; the spread of
infection was as much caused by the cheeseparing policies of the Randlords as by
the workers' rejection of offensive faci l i t ies . The mineowners' refusal to
provide fresh water underground was another case in point. In the absence of
fresh supplies, mineworkers were forced to tap water from holes in the ground or
containing tubercle bacilli•,»*
The acid disinfectant water on the Witwatersrand usually killed the larvae of the
hookworm responsible for the intestinal disease,, ankylostomiasis, .Yet in 1906
these natural impediments could hot stop a major outbreak of the disease, which
occurred on an unidentified deep level mine. Although the Chamber of Mines
ensured that the 'official enquiry' was 'hushed up', this epidemic (and there
were probably several others) was indicative of the severe underground
pollution.19*
The condition of change houses was generally improved after the war. But some
were distinctly shoddy, such as the 'sheds' of the Robinson group, which were
s t i l l being used as change houses well after 1910. Health officers contended that
miners, who avoided the change houses, were 'careless' and 'ignorant', and were
therefore themselves responsible for contracting infections. This criticism was
unwarranted. Most miners considered the change houses beneficial and only shunned
them'when they were deficient.193
Following the Weldon Commission's recommendation, mine doctors suggested that the
industry build simple warmed change houses for Africans. „ . „ at the headgears. But the
colonial Mines Department, like i ts republican predecessor, failed to make this
compulsory. A few mining houses voluntarily provided shelters for Africans in
lieu of change houses, But this procedure was exceptional.194 Health officials
did not seem to realise that Africans, like their white counterparts,
deliberately avoided the change houses because of their spartan and distasteful
conditions.
In 1906 a regulation was enacted stipulating that change houses be routinely
built for Africans. But the Chamber of Mines opposed tne provision on the ground
of expense. In 1907, however, on the advice of the mine doctors, the Randlords
agreed to provide shelters or waiting-rooms, which would be warmed during winter.
They would not be built everywhere, but only at those shaftheads situated at some
distance from the compounds. The shelters were intended to reduce the tropical
Africans' 'exposure to wet and bleak weather1, and to prevent them from
contracting pneumonia. But as many mineowners obtained exemptions from providing
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shelters, even this watered-down provision proved to be a dead letter.1*5
Had change houses been built, the tropical Africans' capacity to adapt to
different temperature levels might have been improved. But exposure to
fluctuating temperature and humidity changes was only one factor in the cause of
pneumonia epidemics. Any significant improvement in the prevention and treatment
of pneumonia required radical changes in both the social and medical services for
African mineworkers. But the doctors did not recommend radical changes (and the
mineowners did not implement them voluntarily), because of the large capital
costs involved.
As with pneumonia, the industry's half-hearted and piecemeal attempts to prevent
silicosis failed to reduce the incidence of the disease in any way up to 1910.
Such a reduction called for medical and hygienic precautions to be implemented at
the same time as dust prevention measures.
Credit must be given to two doctors who showed the medical profession what could
be achieved through speaking openly with courage and integrity. In 1906 Donald
Macaulay and Louis G. Irvine presented a paper entitled 'Safety Measures in
Mining* to the Chemical, Metallurgical and Mining Society of South Africa. The
second part of the paper, which was devoted to the prevention of silicosis,
provokea much positive and open discussion, but only among the organisations'
members.1** This persuaded the doctors to seek a wider audience, and they
presented their findings the following year as evidence to the Mining Regulations
Commission, appointed €o investigate, inter alia, the health grievances of the
miners who haa gone on strike early in iyo/. Although the miners had many
erievances, the catalyst for the strike was the hign silicosis mortality among
Them.' V
The doctors' findings concerning the high death rate among rock drillers in
particular strongly influenced the commissioners and prompted them to take an
unusual step. In November 1908, long before they had completed their report and
two years before its publication (in August 1910), the commissioners sent an
urgent directive to Jacob de Villiers, Minister of Mines, in which they pressed
him to enact immediate and more comprehensive anti-dust measures. Included in
their recommendations was a draft regulation that gave detailed instructions for
installing water pipes.1*8
Although this recommendation was acted upon immediately, the new government of
Botha and Smuts was as disinclined to enforce health measures as the previous
colonial government had been. Although the responsible government cabinet was
fully apprised of the mortality from silicosis, De Villiers went so far as to
claim that the miners' complaints regarding ventilation deficiencies were
groundless, and that the silicosis among them was self-inflicted and due to their
negligence.199 Without government support for reform the Transvaal medical
profession relapsed into lethargy after its brief flurry of activity. Even those
doctors who had helped make piecemeal improvements possible, continued to be
paternalistic and, more perniciously, carried on blaming the victims; the
regulations, they stated, were necessary to protect the 'ignorant' miners from
the risks involved in their work.200
No provision was made for the hospitalisation and care of disabled silicotics who
endured agony until they died. The Johannesburg Hospital, with its 275 beds for
white patients, had no facilities for nursing patients with chronic illness and
refused to admit sufferers of infectious disease, including tuberculosis, unless
they were 'more or less in extremis'.201 The only option for silicotics was
admission to the Rietfontein Hospital, a government institution consisting of a
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lazaretto (the depot for plague and syphilis, as well a3 other infectious cases),
and a chronic sick, home (the depot for 'incurable diseases'). Established in 1903
to relieve the congestion in the Johannesburg Hospital and 3ituated seven miles
east of Johannesburg (a day's walk from the town)t the Rietfontein hospital
consisted of 'a collection of wood and iron shanties located anyhow on the
veldt*. Silicotics boycotted it not only because its conditions'were deplorable -
as even the medical profession acknowledged - but also because they resented
being classed together with the other inmates as 'undesirables'.20'
The initiatives for supporting destitute silicosis sufferers stemmed not from the
medical profession^ but from the Association of Mine Managers. In 1908 it
successfully petitioned the Chamber to erect a sanatorium on land provided by the
Botha-Smuts government. But the lavish nursing home. Springkell, which resulted,
proved to be a white elephant. The miners shunned it because of its remoteness
(twelve miles from the town) and because they had a horror of dying in isolation.
This horror was all the more immediate because their major recreation was 'seeing
a funeral twice a week.'263
Similar palliatives were not provided for Africans suffering from silicosis. They
simply died on the mines or returned home to do so. The vulnerability of long-
service Africans to the disease was not in question. It was accepted that these
Africans, who were few in number, succumbed.204 This was reflected in the
mortality data for silicosis: although unofficial figures were considerably
higher than those derived from the industry's records (12 per 1000 per annum),
they were still so low as to be insignificant compared with other diseases.20*
What was a puzzle was the susceptibility to the disease of migrants. In providing
the solution to this issue, which was especially important as it involved the
bulk of the black workforce, the medical profession did not disappoint the
mineowners.
Immediately after the Anglo-Boer War most doctors were of the opinion that the
migrants' short contracts protected them from the ravages of the disease, whereas
whites, who were exposed to dust for a long uninterrupted period, were
particularly vulnerable.20* The public believed this, too, hence the disease's
nick-name. The White Death'.207 In 1906 the research of a mine doctor, George
Albert Turner junior, son of the Transvaal Medical Officer of Health, gave this
belief enormous substance. In that vear Turner's employers, the Witwatersrand
Native Labour Association, the Chamber's recruiting agency, sent him on a fact-
finding mission to the southern Portuguese East Coast provinces, the industry's
single biggest source of African recruits. The purpose of his visit was to
investigate the allegation that the industry was sending home silicotic and
tuberculous mineworkers, who were infecting the rural Africans, formerly free of
tuberculosis.208 After a brief visit, during which he cursorily inspected the
inhabitants of more than thirty rural communities for symptoms of the diseases,
Turner reported that the prevalence of both illnesses was minimal.209
Despite the limitations of his research, based only on crude observation, the
medical profession unquestioningly accepted his assumptions as facts: silicosis
was negligible among migrant workers; their short contracts reduced their
vulnerability to silicosis; and their 'rests' between contracts in their 'kraals'
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at home restored their health.2t0 Turner's report, which the Chamber
immediately published, was convenient for both the medical profession and the
industry. It confirmed the unfounded assumptions of most doctors; and it
vindicated the mineowners' policy of employing short-term contract workers. The
report also had long-term effects. Until the 1930s the medical profession saw no
reason to conduct further research on the relationship between micrancy and
silicosis. Likewise, the mineowners used Turner's findings, elevated to medical
orthodoxy, to justify the perpetuation of the migrant labour system.21'
In 1910, on the eve of Union, the report of the Mining Regulations Commission was
finally published. Its 'sensational' findings outraged the public exposed for the
first time to the realities of the carnage In the industry. The public's demand
for substantial reforms was not because of pressure from the Witwatersrand
doctors. Rather, it was because of their omissions.
Assessing the early-day role of the Witwatersrand medical profession
As this paper has shown, racial discrimination, in the guise of Social Darwinism,
played an important role in promoting disparities between white and black
mineworkers as regards their health services. But 'racism' was not the sole or
even the major determinant of the overall quality of the industry's early-day
health services.212
In the first two decades of the industry's history the gap between the standards
of health care for white workers and blacks was not as wide as is all too often
assumed.213 In fact, white workers were also the recipients of inadequate
health care, a circumstance which the concept of 'racism* cannot satisfactorily
explain. After all, white mineworkers enjoyed a superior status in the labour
hierarchy and were endowed with fair skins!
Like their 'inferior' black counterparts, white mineworkers, the so-called
'aristocrats of labour', were treated callously by those responsible for their
welfare. Similarly, the spurious contention of the controlling bodies, that
workers were responsible for their own illnesses, was not necessarily a racially-
inspired argument: both white and black workers were told that their illnesses
were self-inflicted. Nor was paternalism essentially the product of 'racism';
health officers believed that white miners as well as black mineworkers had to be
protected from their allegedly harmful practices. Stereotypes of this sort were
class-based rather than 'racist'.
Much was demanded of the general medical practitioner, the jack-of-all trades,
who was expected to be an expert in all medical fields: from dispensing
psychological advice and medicine to performing operations and delivering babies.
On paging through the early-day South African medical journals one cannot help
but be moved, even overwhelmed, by the conscientiousness of a great many
individual doctors, who committed themselves unstintinglv to tne welfare of their
patients. This is confirmed by their obituaries: many witwatersrand doctors, when
they died, were weary and strained from overwork. Their talents, too, were
manifold; a great many strove for professional excellence, devoting their spare
time to research and writing, and to preparing cases for group discussions.
All this provided the substance for George Bernard Shaw's complaint against
doctors; they were too immersed in their work and too intent on earning good
livelihoods to be the custodians of public health. For these reasons he believed
that the onerous duty of guarding public welfare should be entrusted to state
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medical officers of health.214 He might have changed his mind, however, if he
had been acquainted with Dr Charles Porter, Medical Officer of Health for
Johannesburg.
Porter, who sat on many health commissions, was responsible for a variety of
fruitful recommendations intended to improve the health of mineworkers.
Nonetheless he, lifce Irvine and Macaulay, could not actually bring himself to the
point of criticising the industry's responsibility for the very malpractices that
needed to be reformed. In fact, in 1914 Dr Albert J. Gregory, retired Cape
Medical Officer of Health and, significantly, not a Transvaaler, publicly
censured Porter for his uncritical acceptance of the health care of African
mineworkers. Porter's post, he alleged identified him 'intimately with the
existing system of control .21S Nor was this the first time that Porter was
publicly criticised; in 1913, in the Union House of Assembly, H. Mentz, the MP
tor Zoutspansberg, claimed that it was impossible for Porter to be objective
about the health care of African mineworkers, 'because it might trench on his own
work'.216
Porter was equally negligent about the living conditions of white miners. It was
the Mines Department that had to remind him about the evils of the 'single
quarters':
Now what occurs on every mine is that men in varying stages of this
highly contagious disease [tuberculosis] are accommodated in the same
room with healthy young men. What is the inevitable result! The
pthisical [sic] man by his habit of spitting about the floor conveys
his disease to his fellow room mate. The Latter continues to work
underground. The disease rapidly develops under underground
conditions and he goes to join the great majority. This state of
affairs savours more of the ignorance of the middle ages than of the
scientific enlightenment of the 20th. Century. What would the great
medical authorities of the world say to a state of affairs which
permits a man in the last stages of tuberculosis to be confined in a
stuffy room with another man hitherto immune from the disease?217
It was only after 1910, when it became politically acceptable for him to do
so,218 that he advocated reforming the single quarters .2'9 Needless to
say, such improvements now had the sanction of the Randlords. 22°
Conclusion
The economic interests of the mineowners largely shaped the shoddy fabric of the
industry's early-day health services, and it was to these financial concerns that
the medical profession pandered. As a group the doctors were cowed into silence
and submission by the industry which dominated the community, and on which they
also relied for their livelihoods.
This control could not have been possible without state support for the industry.
The degree of backing varied with each successive government. But in the area of
health care it was relatively consistent: notwithstanding the enactment by the
state of health regulations, each government virtually allowed the industry a
free hand.
The industry's commanding role with regard to health, explains why the medical
profession's response to the two major post-war health crises in the industry -
the high pneumonia mortality among Africans and the high silicosis mortality
among white miners - was as undistinguished as it was apathetic. The losers were
the mineworkers, both black and white. By being passive the doctors allowed the
health of their charges to be sacrificed to the profits of the mineowners.
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